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RECENT DECISIONS
Am. LAW-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF AIRPLANE OWNER FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF PILOT-Plaintiff, passenger in an airplane owned by defendant as proprietor of the flight school and piloted by a flight trainee
with defendant's permission, suffered injuries in a crash allegedly caused
by the negligence of the pilot and brought this action against defendant
owner to recover damages. The trial court sustained defendant's motion
to dismiss the complaint. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded for new
trial. If the allegations of negligence of the pilot are found to be true,
defendant would be liable for plaintiff's injuries even though he was not
in actual control of the airplane. The governing statutory provisions define
"operation of aircraft" to include causing or authorizing the operation of
aircraft,! and make it unlawful to "operate an aircraft" in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger others.2 Such operation makes the owner
negligent per se and liable for the resulting damage. Lamasters v. Snodgrass,
248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W. (2d) 622 (1957).
At common law, airplane ownership alone is not a sufficient basis upon
which to predicate liability for torts caused by the negligence of the pilot.8
Many states, however, have statutes specifically making the owner of an
aircraft liable for injury to persons or property on the land or water caused

1 Iowa Code (1954) §328.1(14): "'Operation of aircraft' or 'operate aircraft' means
the use of aircraft for the purpose of air navigation, and includes the navigation or
piloting of aircraft and shall embrace any person who causes or authorizes the operation
of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner,
lessee, or othenvise)."
2 Iowa Code (1954) §328.42: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to operate an
aircraft in the air space above this state or on the ground or water within this state
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another."
s Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P. (2d) 1096 (1938). However, in
1938 the drafters of the Restatement of Torts considered aviation at its stage of develop•
ment at that time an inherently dangerous activity. TORTS RESTATEMENT §520, comments
b, d, g (1938). It was stated that one engaging in such activity should be liable for all
resulting foreseeable harm without regard to the degree of care exercised. TORTS RESTATEMENT §519 (1938). The more modern view is that aviation is not inherently dangerous
and that ordinary rules of tort law govern the liability of owner and operator. Boyd v.
White, 128 Cal. App. (2d) 641, 276 P. (2d) 92 (1954); 4 A.L.R. (2d) 1306 (1949); but see
Grain Dealers Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 726. Thus
an owner may be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Bruce v. O'Neal
Flying; Service, Inc., 231 N.C. 181, 56 S.E. (2d) 560 (1949). Other probable common law
grounds of owner liability for damages caused by his airplane while it is being used by
another include lending the airplane to one known by the owner to be reckless or incompetent [see Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. (2d) 102, 229 P. (2d) 114
(1951); Central Flying Service v. Crigger, 215 Ark. 400, 221 S.W. (2d) 45 (1949)), and
allowing another to use an airplane known by the owner to be in defective condition
[see Brewer v. Thomason, 215 Ark. 164, 219 S.W. (2d) 758 (1949). See also D'Aquilla v.
Pryor, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 346). Some states have specifically provided by statute
that rules of liability applicable to torts on land are equally applicable to certain aircraft
mishaps. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §305.040.
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by ascent or descent of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object
therefrom, without regard to the owner's negligence. 4 Statutes defining
"operation of aircraft" in a manner similar to the Iowa statute are also
quite widespread. 5 For the most part these latter provisions have been
copied from a portion of the federal Civil Aeronautics Act.6 Only two
cases in addition to the principal case have been faced with the question
whether statutes of this type have expanded the common law liability of
the airplane owner in tort cases.7 While the owner was held liable for the
negligence of the pilot in each of these cases, both involved injuries to
persons on the ground rather than to a passenger in the plane.8 The factual
context of the principal case is one which raises interesting questions of
policy. The plaintiff here was a passenger in the aircraft who would have
avoided harm had he decided not to accompany the pilot. In recognition of
the difference between the position of a guest and that of an innocent
person not in the plane, some states have enacted statutes refusing to allow
the guest to recover against either the pilot or the owner absent severe
misconduct on the part of the pilot.9 On the basis of the language in the
present Iowa statute, however, there appears to be no logical way to deny
the owner's liability to a guest for "careless or reckless" actions of the pilot
once it is recognized that the owner's liability has been extended to third
persons. An analogy might be drawn from statutes of this type to motor
vehicle statutes which commonly make the owner liable for negligent acts
of one to whom he lends his automobile.10 Such statutes have generally
been regarded as proper legislation protecting the public from irresponsible
drivers without imposing an undue burden upon the owner.11 It would
seem that the holding in the principal case has the same policy consider•
ations to recommend it. Legislation which places the burden on the air•
craft owner to protect himself adequately through insurance, thus relieving
innocent parties from the risk of incurring injuries caused by a financially

4 Uniform Aeronautics Act §5, 11 U.L.A. 161 (1938). The defense of contributory
negligence is available under this act. Although almost half the states adopted the
Uniform Aeronautics Act at one time, it has since been repealed in several of them. In
1943 this act was removed from the Active List of Uniform Laws. See 19 TEMPLE L. Q.
496 (1946).
5 Such statutes are to be found in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont.
6 52 Stat. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §401(26).
7 Hays v. Morgan, (5th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 481; Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168,
97 A. (2d) 223 (1953).
s One writer has severely criticized the result of the Hays case, on the basis of both
statutory interpretation and public policy. Witherspoon, "When Is the Owner of an
Aircraft Liable?" 60 COMM. L. J. 312 (1955).
9 E.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code (Deering, 1951; Supp. 1957) §21406. Compare automobile
guest statutes; e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §256.29; Iowa Code (1954) §321.494.
10 E.g., Iowa Code (1954) §321.493.
11 See 21 MINN. L. 'R.Ev. 823 (1937).
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irresponsible pilot, seems socially desirable. There is little reason to
believe such a result would unduly discourage private air travel; 12 certainly
there has been no apparent decline in the area of motor vehicle travel
where such laws are now in force.
On the basis of statutory interpretation, however, the soundness of
this decision is open to greater question. Since the definitional provision
here involved was copied in Iowa and many other states from a federal
statute, 13 it is at least doubtful that the various state legislatures intended
to create such an important extension of liability by a statute enacted in
this manner. This seems particularly true since the significance of the
copied provision had not yet been established by any federal decision.
This uncertainty is fortified by the fact that some of the states enacting the
provision do not have an analogous section in their motor vehicle acts, 14
though the difference in policy considerations is not apparent. In Iowa the
doubt that such a result was intended is further increased by a later and
seemingly inconsistent provision in the same act. 15 The need for some
provision for owner liability to third persons for the negligence of the pilot
seems apparent. However, in view of the arguably justifiable creation of
an exception for liability to guests and in view of the magnitude of the
change which the decision in the principal case effects in common law,
it is suggested that a similar decision on the question in other jurisdictions
should await a less dubious expression of legislative intent.

George E. Lohr, S.Ed ..

12 But see Witherspoon, "When Is the Owner of an Aircraft Liable?" 60 COMM. L. J.
312 (1955).
13 Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 979 (1938), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §401(26).
14 This is true in both Mississippi and New Hampshire where Hays v. Morgan, note
7 supra, and Hoebee v. Howe, note 7 supra, were decided.
15 Iowa Code (1954) §328.37 provides that it shall be illegal "to operate, or cause or
authorize to be operated" any civil aircraft without a certificate of registration. This
seems to indicate that "operate" is not intended to include within its meaning "cause or
authorize to be operated,'' and is contrary to the definition section of the statute set out
in note 1 supra. It can be argued, however, that "cause or authorize to be operated"
in §328.37 should be interpreted as redundant, thereby making this section consistent
with the definition section.

